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The past year’s events acutely illustrate the power of human migration. Movements across and 
within borders can reshape lives and families. The popular and political responses they engender can 
also catalyse fundamental political reorderings (see Bremner 2015; Kanter, 2015). Few will deny such 
power in countries bordering Syria, Iraq and Somalia that face millions of new arrivals who are 
actively, if unwittingly, reshaping their populations (see Aziz 2016; Yarnell, 2016). Yet across all 
world regions, people’s movements are at the centre of political debate and policy making in ways 
previously unseen: the Brexit vote; challenges to Angela Merkel’s tenure; promises to build ‘an 
impenetrable and beautiful’ wall between the United States and Mexico (ITV, 2016a); riots in 
Singapore; and South Africa’s de facto withdrawal from its obligations under the 1951 United Nations 
Refugee Convention (Smith, 2016). All reflect reassertions of exclusive nationalism as bulwark 
against migration’s perceived cultural, economic and physical threats. Simultaneous mobilizations for 
immigrant inclusions and rights reveal hardening battle lines over the future of sovereignty and 
society (Edwards, 2015; ITV, 2016b). 
 
Two major annual reports from the United Nations could not come at a more propitious time. The 
first, by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population 
Division, is intended to provide ‘the international community with timely and accessible population 
data and analysis of population trends and development outcomes for all countries and areas of the 
world’ (UNDESA, 2016). UNDESA’s International Migration Report 2015: Highlights focuses broadly 
on movement across international borders irrespective of the motivations or causes of that 
movement. The second is by the United Nation’s Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and focuses on sub-
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categories of migrants, namely people displaced by conflict, persecution and natural disasters. The 
data included in UNHCR’s Global Trends speaks to some of the most contentious political issues of 
the past two years.  
 
It is difficult to overstate the reports’ significance in light of international migration’s explosive 
valence today. They function as important foundations of fact, on the basis of which a range of 
actors at the global, national and local levels can and do develop policy and take action. They also 
serve as vital benchmarks against which these actors and the broader policy world can calibrate 
understandings of international migration. Although facts and critical consideration cannot alone 
produce sound or sensible policy on issues so emotionally charged, they can act as bulwarks against 
myths and cynical mobilizations. They can ease fears and redirect attention to people, places and 
processes otherwise ignored or misunderstood. They may also reveal migration and displacement’s 
true impacts on the economic, physical and cultural security of migrants, hosts and sending 
communities. 
 
While welcome and laudable, these reports have serious shortcomings. Some of these are technical 
or structural. Collecting and aggregating complex and irregularly collected data is a big ask under the 
best of circumstances. The necessary reliance on member states to produce the data only heightens 
the challenge. That the same states dictate the agencies’ mandate makes things no easier. Yet even 
within these constrains, these agencies make choices about what to emphasize or omit in their 
reports. These are conscious, often tactical choices that risk dangerous distortions. The following 
pages offer a critical review of these two documents that identifies a number of these.  
 
Although we highlight certain figures and findings, our aim is neither to summarize nor engage in 
demographic analysis. There are others better situated to those tasks. Rather, we qualitatively 
interrogate the reports’ strengths and weaknesses and the potential implications of both in shaping 
popular and policy responses to human mobility. Our approach is primarily socio-legal and works 
from a social constructivist position in which political actions, decisions and ‘objectivity’ flow from 
cognitive schema shaped in part by the kind of numbers and analysis these reports include. That the 
people, places and processes described are often beyond the global media and scholarly gaze because 
they are remote, informal or politically marginal only enhances such reports’ potential impact.  
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Our commentary is structured around two broad points, each discussed more completely in the 
remaining pages: 
 
• Categorization and Aggregation: Unsurprisingly, the two reports organize and characterize 
people’s movements in language shaped by bureaucrat and legal logics. In many instances 
this leads to over aggregation of people and processes in ways that shroud as much as reveal. 
This is particularly the case with the UNDESA report which does little to move beyond age 
and gender. In many ways this also characterizes the UNHCR report, although here the 
agency disaggregates in ways that raise questions: a parsing of people based solely on legal 
status that may say little about their vulnerabilities, traits or experiences. Both reports largely 
overlook migrations that shape and directly impact the people they do discuss. These 
include, inter alia, domestic mobility of various kinds including urbanization and oscillating 
migration as well as movements linked to climate change and shifting economic 
opportunities. In ethnically and politically fragmented post-colonial states, domestic moves 
may be just as significant if not more so than relocating beyond borders. Indeed, this is part 
of the justification for the UNHCR’s emphasis on internally displaced persons. 
 
The statistical organization of the world into clearly bound nation states and readily 
categorized people — each attached to a single causal factor behind their movement — both 
reveals and obfuscates. It exposes a bureaucratic mind-set that, as indicated, observes and 
labels in particular ways. Moreover, it illuminates the agencies’ respective efforts to ‘own’ 
categories of people and processes. This is particularly the case as the UNHCR has 
expanded its mandate from ‘Convention Refugees’ (those qualifying under the 1951 UN 
Refugee Convention) to innumerable other categories of ‘refugee-like’ populations. More 
importantly, the reports’ bureaucratized migrant-centrism hides important aspects of the 
populations not revealed by their migrant classifications: their motivations, needs, potential 
impacts — to say nothing of their politics and aspirations. By flattening the people and 
processes being discussed, the reports present mono-causal and often deeply depoliticized 
and asocial explanations for movement.  
 
• Geographic Scale, Scope and Politics. Our concern here is two-fold. By ignoring domestic 
mobility, the UNDESA report presents a geographically skewed image of movements and 
Misreading Mobility Final Draft 
4 
	
their implications. While OECD countries may receive the greatest number of international 
migrants, as the report indicates, they are unlikely to be the states most affected by human 
mobility and migration. Including domestic migration and displacement — which accounts 
for the majority of the world’s movements — shifts the focus elsewhere. The reports 
similarly ignore those unable to move due to poverty, disability, social obligations or 
sedenterarization policies and persecution (see Lubkemann, 2008a; 2008b). 
 
Beyond this, while the reports note that the majority of refugees are in ‘the global South’, the 
UNHCR locates the most pressing refugee crises elsewhere. For example, despite the dire 
conditions facing refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries, the UNHCR report spotlights 
the European dimensions of the Syrian refugee crisis.  
 
The analytical question of borders raises a second concern. Reflecting the UN’s state-based 
composition, the report reproduces what might be called ‘methodological nationalism’ and 
the ‘national order of things’ (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003; also Malkki 1992). Expectedly 
given their state-based composition, both agencies have issued reports that naturalize nation 
states as territorial containers somehow punctured or disrupted by movements across its 
boundaries. This is a long-standing critique (see Agnew, 1999; Paasi, 2009; Reid-Henry 2010) 
that has done little to reshape the language of state-centred UN bodies. Such a lens means 
overlooking not only domestic mobility but also many translocal or transnational processes 
driven by (a) migrants themselves and (b) transnational actors including strategies driven by 
powerful countries that are imbricated and implicated in the violence, economic precarity 
and environmental risks behind many movements. The results are some pictures of mobility 
and responses to it which invisibilize global political and social agency.  
 
The remainder of the report moves through three sections. The first introduces a number of 
numbers: largely headlines figures and facts intended to illustrate the more analytical points that 
follow. The second echoes and elaborates the critiques surfaced above. The review ends with 
reflections on these reports’ utility and strengths. We conclude that they ultimately reinforce 
Eurocentrism and policy interventions that privilege the status quo over comprehensive approaches 
promoting the interests of refugees or migrants and the communities that send, receive and facilitate 
their moves.  





CATEGORIZATION AND AGGREGATION 
 
These reports are fundamentally about statistics. However, the numbers presented do more than 
describe: they nominate central policy concerns; motivate actions from governments and civil 
society; and justify resource expenditure based on their findings. They also reflect, if indirectly, the 
internal financial and political goals, and structures of the authoring agencies. They also contain 
perennial tensions in migration accounts, exemplified most generally by the different agencies’ 
stance on the degree to which migration is an exception, crisis or an increasingly inherent — and 
potentially empowering — part of contemporary human society. 
 
UNDESA firmly demonstrates that international migration is ever more central to contemporary 
socio-economic and political life. It also aims to allay crisis fears by speaking of the normalcy and 
global prevalence of cross-border migration. While reporting that the absolute number of 
international migrants has consistently risen worldwide (173 million in 2000; 191 million in 2005; 
222 million in 2010; and 244 million in 2015 (p. 5)), the rate of increase has not. So while the 
numbers have risen significantly in absolute terms, the growth rate in international migration is not 
dramatically higher than general population growth rates (p. 21). As in years past, the vast majority 
of people stay within their countries of nationality. This will remain the norm in the decades to 
come. That said, the movements of people, ‘contributes significantly to population growth in many 
parts of the world, and reverses negative growth in some countries or areas’ (p. 21). If you are in 
Zimbabwe, Syria or Venezuela, out-migration matters in a big way. Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey 
face almost unprecedented numbers of refugees crossing into their territories. But these are 
exceptions. Faced with these trends, UNDESA’s messages are deliberately measured: migration 
matters; migration deserves global attention, and migration is largely manageable. Crisis results not 
from people moving from ignoring those who do, trying to regulate them in ways that belie their 
needs, motivations and potential impacts.  
 
On the other hand, UNHCR’s data and visual representations trumpets crisis, presumably a 
calculated move to catalyse sorely needed international action and humanitarian and other funding. 
In 2015 there were 65.3 million people displaced worldwide, which is 12.4 million more than the 
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year before. This figure includes Palestinian refugees and other groups whose status as refugees and 
asylum seekers has persisted for long periods. Of these 65.3 million, 21.3 million were refugees and 
another 40.8 million were internally displaced. To top it off, there were 3.2 million asylum seekers, 
or individuals whose claims to refugee status were pending determination. In 2015, 24 people were 
displaced from their homes per minute. This compares to 30 per minute in 2014 and 6 per minute in 
2005. Given the levels of vulnerability and displacement, calls to action are warranted but the cry’s 
tone is problematic. 
 
Although these are staggering figures, it is important to recognize that variations globally may be as 
much a result of data collection as empirics. As methods of estimating populations have improved, 
the number of people counted has climbed. Yet another reason cautioning against treating these 
figures as firm data points — acknowledged even by UNHCR (Crisp, 1999) — is the incentives that 
domestic and international actors have to inflate or manipulate refugee numbers for political 
purposes. The UNHCR has reason to inflate numbers to elicit humanitarian aid; politicians often 
exaggerate figures to mobilize against the invading other. Notwithstanding these caveats, UNHCR 
conveys an unambiguous message: displacement demands immediate action to protect the millions 
forced to move.  
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GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE AND SCALE 
 
The statistics within the two reports present a remarkably different image of migration in terms of 
geographic scope and distribution. If UNDESA reflects a vision of the developing world slowly 
tipping its population towards the somewhat unreceptive yet wealthy North, UNHCR’s statistics 
clearly illustrate that displacement is, at least in numerical terms, largely a concern of ‘Southern’ 
cities, countries and communities.  
 
According to UNHCR, the ‘developing world’ hosts 86 per cent of the world’s refugees compared 
with 70 per cent 20 years ago (p. 18). The least developed countries (again using United Nations 
categorizations) provide asylum to 26 per cent of the global total. Sub-Saharan African continues to 
host the largest number of refugees with 4.4 million. The Asia-Pacific region had 3.8 million (a slight 
decline from the previous year) while the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) hosted 2.7 million. 
Within the Middle East the proportion of certain national populations that comprise refugees is 
notably high: 18.3 per cent of Lebanon’s population is now refugees; and 8.7 per cent of Jordan’s. 
The Americas (North, South and Central) hosted only 746,800 (p.14). By the end of 2015, the 30 
countries with the largest numbers of refugees per GDP (PPP) per capita were all in developing 
regions with the exception of Russia which squeaked in at 30th place (p.18). The Democratic 
Republic of Congo, a country at war with itself and its neighbours since the mid-1990s, tops the 
table. Ethiopia and Pakistan are next. Given these displacement numbers, the UNHCR offers a 
dissonant message: while the refugee statistics point to sobering challenges in the South, the report 
focus attention on Northern concerns, a point elaborated below. 
 
UNDESA’s statistics, on the other hand, at least partially justify centring analysis of Northerly 
migration by noting the preponderance of international migrants within OECD countries. In their 
words, ‘[while] the majority of international migrants worldwide live in high-income countries, most 
migrants [as opposed to refugees] originate from middle-income countries’ (p. 14). If nothing else, 
this report belies claims of ‘job-stealing (and potentially murderous) hordes’ flooding wealthy 
countries from distant lands, conjured regularly by xenophobic politicians and fear mongers. 
Moreover, ‘in many parts of the globe, migration occurs primarily between countries that are located 
within the same major area of the world’ (p. 16). This form of regionally contained migration 
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appears to be on the rise (pp. 16–7) with (once again), Asia at the centre of growth. All the same, 
relatively wealthy countries are at the centre of many international migration systems.  
 
Significantly, UNDESA’s statistical findings must themselves be considered an artefact of the 
geographic scale privileged in the data collected and assessed by UN member states. UNDESA’s 
report largely excludes domestic migration, and even among the different forms of international 
migration it privileges typically more expensive forms which allow people to move from South to 
North. Since many migrants in the global South cannot afford such moves, their mobility is either 
regional or domestic. Even when crossing borders within regions where data collection is poor, they 
remain invisible. This selection bias means we are presented with a picture of wealthier migrants 
moving into wealthier countries. This is a data gap UNDESA should acknowledge but does not.  
 
That UNDESA’s report largely excludes domestic migration not only sustains a myopic focus on the 
kinds of international migration facing wealthy countries, but also obscures the sub-national 
migration and other processes shaping responses to international migrants. As an increasing body of 
work demonstrates, we live in a world in which the most important responses to international 
migrants are not from states per se but are shaped in the specific neighbourhoods or zones where 
migrants reside (see, among others, Landau, 2014; Saunders, 2011; Vertovec, 2007). In many cases, 
these sites are destinations for significant numbers of domestic migrants and marginalized citizens. 
While there are undoubtedly high levels of vulnerability among displaced populations, there are 
often equally high levels of vulnerability among host populations and other migrant populations 
(Landau and Duponchel, 2011; Myroniuk and Vearey, 2014). Analytically distancing international 
migrants from these sub-national dynamics significantly limits the ability to develop effective, ethical 
and politically palatable policy responses.  
 
The scalar focus of UNDESA and UNHCR cannot be divorced from the international law at the 
foundation of the global regime to which both belong. States are the traditional subjects of the 
international legal system anchored in the United Nations framework, and this state-centricity 
privileges national action, national borders and national interests. The effects of this are perhaps 
most vivid in UNHCR’s report: it acknowledges that the number of internally displaced persons is 
double that of refugees, but nonetheless devotes far more analytical and policy attention to the latter. 
International law, which while establishing international legal obligations for states to protect 
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refugees, establishes no analogous obligations for IDPs. UNHCR can make a legal case for 
international attention to the plight of refugees in a way it cannot for IDPs. 
 
From the perspective of geographic scope and scale, and of data aggregation and categorization, 
certain choices reflected in these reports are increasingly at odds with the kind reterritorialization of 
socio-political and economic processes. As such, they do little to elucidate the nature of migration or 
migrants but do hide many things. These include the growth of diasporic communities; the ‘multiple 
elsewhere’ (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2004; also Levitt, 2001) that drive refugee and migrant 
imaginations, and other socio-economic and political processes that drive movements and shape 
responses to them.  
 
That neither report consistently disaggregates data by more than age and sex is similarly blinding. 
Although important, there is a need to move beyond these characteristics which may not be the 
most salient determinants of the migration experience. Race, religion, ethnicity and class, for 
example, are just as important for making sense of migration and the socio-political processes 
associated with it. Such data are not typically collected and shared by states — and hence do not 
appear in the report — but their problematic absence is nonetheless worth noting. 
 
 
POLITICS AND GEOPOLITICS 
 
A striking feature of both reports is the depoliticized pictures they paint, and the geopolitics they 
nonetheless reflect and advance. If the disparate treatment of North and South in the UNDESA 
report rests in controvertible decisions about what scale of migration warrants global attention, the 
same cannot be said of UNHCR’s Global Trends. The latter more vividly reflects the geopolitics that 
fundamentally structure global responses to displacement and that implicitly shape the construction 
of crisis in that report. Consider that despite the overwhelming density of Syrian Refugees within 
Syria’s vicinity, UNHCR’s Global Trends accords special treatment (beginning on p. 32) to what it 
terms the ‘European Refugee Crisis 2015’. There is no question that the situation in Europe is 
serious. In 2015 alone the European Union had 1,015,078 arrivals by sea (asylum seekers and 
others), compared to only about 220,000 the year before (there were only about 75,000 in the first 
half of 2014 (UNHCR, 2005: 6). Another 3,771 people were reported dead or missing in the waters 
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separating Europe from Asia and Africa. However, the decision to devote a special section to the 
European dimensions of a refugee crisis that is to a great extent regionally contained in the Middle 
East1 and to spotlight no other regional refugee crisis speaks volumes as to the people and places that 
the global system — or at least UNHCR’s corner of it — prioritizes. 
 
As presented, the report naturalizes the sense of panic and concern helping to reshape not only 
Europe’s response to migrants, but to the idea of Europe generally. Yet the crisis in Europe arguably 
has more to do with regional and national political projects, priorities and structures than any 
objective capacity to extend humane treatment to refugee and migrant arrivals. After all, Brexit was 
fundamentally about domestic interests politically mobilizing perceptions of uncontrolled 
immigration. The UNHCR report abets such fears by representing refugees arriving in Europe 
largely as wards in need of protection and assistance, and rarely as agents capable of self-sustenance. 
This belies the fact that for many European countries facing declining populations, admitting and 
regularizing refugees’ stay can provide much needed labour while meeting humanitarian obligations 
(Achiume, 2017). The irony is that the relatively skilled and semi-skilled refugees and migrants from 
countries such as Syria and Iraq are among the most vilified in national and regional discourses of 
exclusion in Europe. As the previous paragraph indicates, far poorer countries — DRC, Lebanon, 
Ethiopia — have far higher percentages of refugees per capita and are facing potentially destabilizing 
crises as a result. Yet the UNHCR looks past them. 
 
If there is a region that can afford and accommodate refugees, Europe is it. While it may cost 
materially and politically in the short term, Europe’s refugee crisis is not rooted in legitimate 
concerns regarding the long-term economic impact of refugees and other displaced. Missing from 
UNHCR’s report, perhaps inevitably, is the rise and gradual mainstreaming of far-right political 
parties and how this and other European socio-political dynamics are fuelling exclusion and 
bolstered the crisis framing of Europe’s refugee situation. Indeed, together with the Brexit vote, the 
refugee crisis in Europe is best understood not as a short-term humanitarian emergency but in terms 
of what it is doing to the nature of Europe, Europe’s relations with the world (particularly Turkey 
and North Africa), and Europe’s voice — already compromised — on behalf of humane global 
humanitarianism.  
																																																						
1 See Achiume (2015a); Arar et al. (2016); Caryl (2016). 




The elevation of European concerns, notwithstanding the material and political circumstances facing 
Southern countries accompanies a broader if different political erasure. Through a combination of 
its European focus and methodological nationalism, the report text implicitly and sometimes 
explicitly locates the source of displacement and migration almost exclusively within source 
countries. Without denying the sometimes disastrous policy decisions, incompetence and 
authoritarianism in such sites, we ought not to overlook the transnational impacts of international 
and foreign militaries and foreign policy. Internationalized and proxy conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, 
Libya and Somalia, for example — all countries from which refugees and others are fleeing — 
involve many of the same countries in the North that remain reluctant to admit those displaced by 
these conflicts (Achiume, 2017; Bird, 2011; Krug, 2016).  
 
This leads to a more general point: both the UNHCR and UNDESA report — and many others like 
them — are remarkably devoid of politics. One could read them in their entirety without an 
understanding that the crises are largely political and that Europe, the US and Russia are not only 
receiving or rejecting migrants, but are the authors and abettors of policies that sustain poverty and 
promote displacement. European conditions should be part of these reports, but the 
decontextualized, depoliticized emphasis on Europe reinforces the primacy of European migration 
concerns — the most extreme of which are firmly rooted in illiberal ideology — over those of other 
regions whose hosting capacity concerns have material bases. It also aids the normalization of deeply 
problematic innovations such as the migrant swop negotiated between EU and Turkey (Norwegian 
Refugee Council, 2016).  
 
If politics and geopolitics are missing from UNHCR’s report, so too is the role of law. Returning 
once more to Global Trends’ European refugee crisis coverage, there is no mention of inadequacies 
within the international and regional frameworks in place to govern refugee flows. Yet the governing 
legal and policy regimes do little to ease the chaos and crisis in international displacement (Achiume, 
2015b; Ramji-Nogales, 2017). Within the global refugee regime, it is relevant to note the absence of 
robust frameworks for ensuring that the largely Southern countries proximate to active conflicts can 
rely on the assistance of more geographically remote countries in the North. Deteriorating 
conditions for the displaced in Syria’s neighbors, for example, are among the reasons people are 
embarking on deadly journeys to more distant countries (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke, 2015). 
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Stronger frameworks demanding wealthy countries do more to support refugee hosting Southern 
states might mitigate the suffering the UNHCR report captures (Achiume, 2015b). Europe’s own 
regional asylum policies similarly incentivize refugee repellent policies for both frontier and interior 
countries. These include its first safe country asylum policy permitting EU countries to send 
refugees back to the first safe country reached within the EU. This encourages countries to tighten 
their borders to keep refugees as far away as possible at the expense of countries at the European 
frontier including Greece and Italy.  
 
The narrow point is that international law and policy should form part of understanding certain 
features of international migration and displacement. That said, what determines the experience of 
many migrants and refugees is not global regimes but domestic practices, policies and networks. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND BUREAUCRATIC TRAPPINGS 
  
The previous sections note the two reports’ political, geopolitical, and legal silences. We also 
highlight institutional choices in the categorization and aggregation of data. To be fair, neither 
UNDESA nor the UNHCR present their reports as scholarly compendia. It is arguably neither 
agency’s responsibility to critically engage with scholarship on the nature of rights, community or the 
meaning of belonging beyond the nation state.  
 
The question is whether it is realistic to ask organizations like UNDESA and the UNHCR to contest 
institutionally embedded wisdom and categories. If anything, their mandates are to do precisely what 
they have done: to report and analyse state-generated figures in ways that reinforce the geo-political 
status quo. Beyond funding, institutional funding matters in maintaining this implicit conservativism. 
UNHCR relies on voluntary donations, most of which come from a remarkably small proportion of 
the world’s states, largely from the global North. The European humanitarian body, ECHO, and the 
United States Population, Refugee, and Migration Bureau are its two largest donors. Given this 
funding structure, it is unsurprising that its report omits the politics and geopolitics that might 
expose biases built into international regimes governing migration (Loescher, 2001). Moreover, 
transgressing categories risks undermining the division of labour within the United Nation system 
which has produced and maintains the language and categories both reports employ. Indeed, such 
organizations may have few reasons to challenge the paradigms in which they work. Given their 
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training and institutional incentives — funding perhaps foremost among them — it may be that 
those within such organizations may struggle to conceive of appropriate alternatives (DiMaggio et 
al., 1991: 11). The prevalence of lawyers and social workers within UNHCR reinforces particular 
narratives of both rights and vulnerability while limiting engagement with politics and the 
implications of statistics. Rather than draw on ‘radical’ analyses to question the principles underlying 
policy (or the ways they make decisions), these agencies are far more likely to ‘muddle through’; to 
make minor adjustments in the face of failed policy in ways that leave structures and imperatives 
intact (see Argyris, 1982; Feldman and March, 1981; Haas, 1990).  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: DIRECTIONS IN DATA COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION 
 
The concerns raised and developed in the remaining pages have scholarly and policy dimensions. 
Although demographers and other migration scholars reading these reports are likely to treat them 
with scepticism tempered by awareness of their purpose and place, these reports have far broader 
and more influential audiences.. Both UNDESA and UNHCR are charged with providing the 
foundation for policy making and interventions undertaken by themselves, by their UN siblings, by 
their implementing partners and (presumably) by regional bodies, states and non-state actors. The 
question is, do these reports succeed in doing so? Our answer is, in part.  
 
UNDESA provides a global overview, but at a level too aggregated to provide for much in the way 
of concrete intervention. Perhaps the reports — particularly that of the UNHCR — are most 
successful in reinforcing the organizations’ long standing messages in ways that, despite talk of crisis, 
do little to discomfit bureaucrats and politicians alike. In doing so, the reports reinforce a 
colonial/imperial geography where the Greenwich meridian — Britain and its European cousins — 
is the world’s political centre. Whether it is migration towards the OECD or refugees at the gate, the 
emphasis shifts attention away from where most people and most migrants live.  
 
Reports of these kinds could do more to recognize the ways in which they are reinforcing the kind 
of cognitive biases and frameworks that reinforce anti-migrant attitudes and make it difficult to 
address human mobility in dispassionate ways. The UNDESA report shies away from crisis helping 
to normalize responses to migration, albeit while overlooking the issues facing poorer countries in 
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managing domestic and international migration or displacement. UNDESA’s almost exclusive focus 
on those who move internationally also subtly separates migrants from the geo-economics and 
politics that shapes human mobility (see Castles et al., 2013). The UNHCR report also reinforces a 
perception of migration, but one which links displacement with acute crisis. This is problematic in 
that it fails to recognize that in a world of Syrias and Somalias, of Afghanistans and Iraqs, being 
displaced is anything but temporary and displacement is in many ways ‘the new normal’. Rather than 
encouraging crisis-driven policy responses, the UNHCR and its allied agencies would ideally be 
working to build long-term systems to regulate and improve resilience rather than offering an image 
that can so easily encourage exclusionary and fear-filled responses. 
 
While we should celebrate the assemblage of data presented here and continually call for 
improvements in its collection and collation, this is not enough. Missing from both these reports is a 
politics of numbers: the reports premised on a kind of enlightenment naivety about the relationship 
between evidence and action. Policy makers and operational agencies often justifiably complain that 
the lack of sound information on the populations they are trying to assist compromises their 
decisions. The scarcity of data is problematic, but even when data are available, values and political 
priorities are often equal determinants of policy outcomes. Value systems are, after all, the keys to 
present problems that need to be ‘solved’ and that provide many of the criteria for evaluating 
possible solutions. The greater the symbolic currency at stake, the more likely such factors will 
determine an outcome although such criteria may be hidden by post hoc justifications couched solely 
in technical terms. Given the political and cultural sensitivities around migrants, the potential for 
politics to trump numbers is always high. This is not an irrational political response, but it may result 
in outcomes with priorities different from those held by international agencies and donors.  
 
Despite the former UN secretary general’s call for a global campaign against xenophobia (Wulfhurst 
2016), few expect United Nations agencies to shift global political attitudes towards migration and 
displacement. However, reinforcing forms of methodological nationalism and invisibilizing places 
and processes may well make things worse for migrants. If nothing else, the approach shaping these 
two reports inadvertently heightens the sense of threat international migration poses while hiding 
the economics and politics behind movements and responses to them.  
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Even as the United Nations looks to ‘solve’ the migration crisis, these reports help disguise many of 
the causes of conflict and reinforce the national basis of political organization. Under such 
circumstances, exclusionary social responses to newcomers claiming space and resources may 
degrade established legal protections as people almost ‘code’ and label those from outside their 
communities/countries as threats to prosperity, security or sovereignty.  
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